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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EXCLUSIONARY RULE-"GOOD FAITH"
EXCEPTION-THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WILL NOT OPERATE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE OFFICER'S VIOLATION WAS
COMMITTED IN THE REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH BELIEF
THAT HIS ACTIONS WERE LEGAL.
United States v. Williams (5th Cir. 1980)
Jo Ann Williams was convicted of possession of heroin and sen-
tenced to three years imprisonment.' Subsequently, the District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio ordered her release pending appeal,2
on the condition that she remain in Ohio. 8 The arresting officer, Special
1. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 1980). Williams
was arrested in Toledo, Ohio and charged with violation of the Controlled
Substances Act. Id. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976). The pertinent section of
the Controlled Substances Act provides: "(a) Except as authorized by this title,
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(l) to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance...." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).. Heroin
is a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1976).
The defendant pleaded guilty after the district court denied her motion
to suppress evidence of the heroin. 622 F.2d at 833. She subsequently ap-
pealed that denial after she was sentenced. Id.
2. 622 F.2d at 833. Williams' release was ordered pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3148. Id. at 833 n.3. The pertinent portion of § 3148 provides:
A person . . . who has been convicted of an offense and . . . has
filed an appeal . . . shall be treated in accordance with the provisions
of section 3146 unless the court or judge has reason to believe that
no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the
person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the
community.
18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976). For the pertinent text of § 3146, see note 3 infra.
3. 622 F.2d at 833. The federal statutory provision providing for release
in noncapital cases prior to trial permits the imposition of travel restrictions
as a condition of release pending appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) (1976).
The statute provides that:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punish-
able by death, shall at his appearance before a judicial officer, be
ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon
the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount speci-
fied by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise
of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required. When such determination is
made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the
above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions
of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
for trial or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combina-
tion of the following conditions:
(2) . . . place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of
abode of the person during the period of release . . .
Id. This section is specifically applied by 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976) to defend-
ants awaiting appellate review of their cases. For the pertinent text of § 3148,
see note 2 supra.
(211)
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Agent Paul J. Markonni of the Drug Enforcement Administration
<DEA), recognized Williams while he was on assignment at the Atlanta
International Airport. 4 Aware of the court imposed travel restriction,5
Markonni approached her for questioning.6 When Williams failed to
satisfactorily explain her absence from Ohio, Markonni arrested her.
7
A search of Williams's person made incident to the arrest s un-
covered a packet of heroin in her pocket in violation of the Controlled
Substances Act.9 Agent Markonni used this evidence to obtain a war-
rant for Williams's luggage 10 which, it was discovered, contained a large
quantity of heroin. 1
Williams moved to suppress all evidence of the heroin.12 The
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia suppressed the evi-
4. 622 F.2d at 834. Markonni saw Williams departing a non-stop flight
from Los Angeles. Id.
5. Id. Markonni had been informed of the travel restrictions by an As-
sistant United States Attorney in Ohio. Id. at 834 n.5.
6. Id. at 834. Markonni identified himself and asked Williams for her
identification. Id. The Supreme Court approved a stop and inquiry of this
type by DEA agents in airport terminals when the individuals freedom of
movement is not constrained by physical force or show of authority. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In response to the agent's question-
ing, Williams produced the same Michigan driver's license she had shown
Markonni when he arrested her the year before in Ohio. 622 F.2d at 34.
7. 622 F.2d at 834. Williams was, therefore, initially arrested for violating
the travel restriction of her release order. Id. Williams was carrying an air-
line ticket that showed she was about to depart for Lexington, Kentucky
which she had produced in addition to her driver's license. Id. Williams ad-
mitted that she had not obtained permission to leave Ohio, and claimed she
was about to leave for Kentucky because it was now her home. Id.
8. Id. Williams was conducted to the airport police office and then
searched. Id.
9. Id. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976). For
ihe pertinent sections of the Act, see note 1 supra.
10. 622 F.2d at 834. Before obtaining the warrant, Agent Markonni took
Williams's baggage claim check and retrieved her unopened luggage. Id. For
the text of the affidavit Markonni presented to the magistrate to secure the
warrant, see id. at 834 n.8. The warrant was necessary because Williams re-
fused to consent to a search of her bags. Id. at 834.
11. Id. at 835.
12. Id. The statutory provision giving DEA agents the power to make
warrantless arrests, provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration
designated by the Attorney General may-
make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the
United States committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony,
cognizable under the laws of the United States, if he has probable
cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or
is committing a felony.
21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (1976). Williams argued that her arrest did not fall within
the ambit of this statute and therefore the arrest was illegal. 622 F.2d at 835.
Williams further contended that if the initial arrest was illegal, then all evi-
dence of the heroin must be suppressed as fruits of an illegal arrest. Id. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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dence and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.18 On rehearing en banc 14 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 15 holding
both the arrest and the search incident to it were legal, and even if the
arrest was illegal, Agent Markonni's reasonable, good faith belief that
defendant's violation of the court imposed travel restriction subjected
her to a legal arrest was sufficient to avoid suppression of the evidence
under the exclusionary rule. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1980).
The exclusionary rule (rule) prohibits the use in a criminal pro-
ceeding of any evidence in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.'6 Since its creation more than sixty-five years ago,' 7 the rule has
13. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1979). In
suppressing the evidence, the district court rejected a magistrate's recom-
mendations. 622 F.2d at 835. The magistrate had concluded that the arrest
was legal and all evidence had been legally obtained. Id.
14. 622 F.2d at 833. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reheard
the case en banc upon its own motion. 594 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1979). The rules
of court in the Fifth Circuit allow for a rehearing en banc on the motion of
any judge of the court. 5TH Cm. R. 16.2.
15. 622 F.2d at 833. The court readied alternative majority holdings,
with each alternative commanding a majority composed of different members
of the 24 member court. Id. For a further discussion of these alternate
holdings, see note 56 infra.
16. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). However,
"despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in
all proceedings or against all persons." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486(1976). Thus, the exclusionary rule is not co-extensive with the fourth amend-
ment guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ...... U.S. CONST. amend IV. In fact, it has been stated
that "'the same authority that empowered the Court to supplement the
[fourth] amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years
after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify that rule as the 'lessons of
experience' may teach.'" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) quoting Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 952-53 (1965) (brackets supplied by the Court)
(footnote omitted). It is not surprising, therefore, that the exclusionary rule,
although emanating from the fourth amendment, has been used flexibly by
the Court. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (admitted
evidence found in search based on statute later found unconstitutional); United
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (admitted testimony of witness where
sufficiently attenuated from illegal search); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976) (balance the rule's deterrent effect against societal costs imposed by
exclusion); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (refusing to apply the ex-
clusionary rule to a fourth amendment claim brought by a state prisoner on
federal habeas corpus); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (admitted
evidence found in search based on statutory construction later found uncon-
stitutional); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (admitted testimony of
witness found through unconstitutional interrogation); United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to apply the rule in grand jury proceed-
ings); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (refusing to give the rule
retroactive application); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (refusing
to apply the rule where the evidence is used solely for the purpose of impeach-
ing a witnesses' testimony at trial). See also Geller, Enforcing the Fourth
1981-82]
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generated a great deal of commentary and criticism.' 8 Most recently,
that criticism has been directed at the rule's "nonselective application"
in that the rule ignores "the nature of the underlying violation" 19 and
is applied to: "both flagrant police misconduct and hapless official
error." 20
One solution suggested by the rule's critics has been the adop-
tion of a "good faith" exception 21 to the rule in circumstances where
the officer's violation was committed with the reasonable, good faith
belief that his actions were legal. 22 The exception would apply to two
frequent kinds of violations: "good faith mistakes," those situations
where the officer makes "a judgmental error concerning the existence of
facts sufficient to constitute probable cause;"23 and "technical viola-
tions," those situations where "an officer ... rely[s] upon a statute which
is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated, or
a court precedent which is later overruled." 24
The Supreme Court, in its recent pronouncements in cases involving
the exclusionary rule, has set the stage for adoption of a good faith
Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WAsH. U. L.
REV. 621, 623 K 625-40.
17. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks made the rule
applicable to the federal courts. Id. For a discussion of the rationale behind
the rule in its original form, see note 27 infra. The rule was not made ap-
plicable to the states until 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a
discussion of Mapp, see 7 VILL. L. REV. 130 (1961). For a concise history of
the rule's development, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976). See
generally Geller, supra note 16, at 625-40.
18. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 424 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). One criticism frequently
leveled against the rule is that its only direct effect is to exclude reliable and
probative evidence from the fact finder. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 489-91;
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
REV. 736, 737 (1972). Furthermore, as yet there is no proof that the rule is
an effective deterrent of future police misconduct. Id. at 739. See generally
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 672-709 (1970).
19, Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable"
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 635 (1978). While the
rule has not been applied in all situations, those circumstances where the rule
has not been applied "do not relate to the nature of the offense." Id. at 635
n.4. For a discussion of cases in which the rule has not been applied, see
note 16 supra.
20. Ball, supra note 19, at 635, citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
609-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
21. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501-02 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White emphasized that the
officer's good faith belief that his actions were legal must also be objectively
reasonable. Id. at 538-40 (White, J., dissenting).
23. Ball, supra note 19, at 635. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,535-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).24. Ball, supra note 19, at 635-36. See Stone v. Powell, 438 U.S. 465, 499
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 538-40 (White, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
[VOL. 27: p. 211
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exception.25 In United States v. Calandra,-6 the Court characterized
the rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved." 27
This definition furthered the possibility of a good faith exception
in two ways. 28 First, by rejecting the premise that the exclusionary rule
is mandated by the Constitution, the Court opened the door to the
development of exceptions, including one based on good faith.29 Second,
by specifying deterrence of future police misconduct as the exclusive
rationale for the rule,30 the Court implied that the rule should not apply
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Calandra dealt with the
application of the rule in the context of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 339.
The Court held that it would not extend the exclusionary rule to such pro-
ceedings. Id. at 349-55. For a further discussion of cases where the rule
does not apply, see note 16 supra.
26. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
27. Id. at 348. But see id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The ex-
clusionary rule .. . [is meant to accomplish] the twin goals of enabling the
judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of as-
suring the people .. .that the government [will] not profit from its lawless
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."). Prior to Calandra several competing justifications were ad-
vanced as the basis for the rule. See Ball, supra note 19, at 650 & n.157. They
included the maintenance of judicial integrity, the fourth amendment right
to be protected from illegal searches and seizures, a combination of the protec-
tions of the fourth and fifth amendments, and the aforementioned deterrence
of future constitutional violations. Id. at 650 n.157. See, e.g., United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (basing the rule on deterrence of future
police misconduct); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (basing the rule
on fourth amendment rights alone); id. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring)
(basing the rule on a combination of fourth and fifth amendment rights);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (basing the rule on fourth
amendment rights and the imperative of judicial integrity). See generally
Geller, supra note 16, at 640-56.
28. See notes 29 & 30 infra.
29. Ball, supra note 19, at 605. If the rule were perceived as a constitu-
tional requirement, then a violation would require its application regardless
of whether the officer acted reasonably and in good faith. Id. Application
of the rule would be the method for effectuating the fourth amendment. Id.
However, once the rule is recognized as a judge made remedy for official mis-
conduct, courts are free to apply it only in those instances where its purposes
will be served. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. But see Schrock
and Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 272-81 (1979) (presenting a theory that
there is a personal constitutional right to exclusion); Sunderland, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. , & C.
141, 148-50 (1978) (presenting a theory supporting the exclusionary rule as a
requirement of constitutional principle).
30. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Accord, Michigan v.
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in those situations where deterrence of future police misconduct cannot
be achieved. 1
A "technical violation" or "good faith mistake" exception to the
exclusionary rule, while having never been adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court, has found support in several recent decisions.3 2 In
Michigan v. DeFillippo 83 the Court faced the question of "whether an
arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance, which at the time
had not been declared unconstitutional, is valid regardless of a subse-
quent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality." 34 In admitting
the evidence seized in the search made incident to that arrest, the Court
held that an officer's determination of whether an offense has been
committed does not include passing judgment on the constitutionality
of the ordinance being relied upon. 3
While no decision has come as close to adopting the "good faith
mistake" exception to the rule as the DeFillippo Court did to adopting
the "technical violation" exception, four Justices have urged adoption of
31. Ball, supra note 19, at 650. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
38 n.3 (1979). In words applicable to the "technical violation" basis for the pro-
posed good faith exception, the DeFillippo court stated: "The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. No conceivable purpose
of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, at the time
it was found on the person of the respondent, was the product of a lawful
arrest and a lawful search." Id. Therefore, if there is no probability of deter-
rence, there is no rational basis for applying the rule. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Peltier v. United
States, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). For a
discussion of these cases, see notes 33-55 and accompanying text infra.
33. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). DeFillippo involved a warrantless arrest for viola-
tion of a law later declared unconstitutional. Id. at 33-34. Acting on prob-
able cause that the ordinance in question had been violated, the officer arrested
DeFillippo in good faith reliance on the ordinance. Id. Drugs were found
on DeFillippo's person in the subsequent search incident to that arrest. Id.
at 34.
34. Id. at 33. The issue as framed by the Court closely resembles the
definition of a "technical violation." See text accompanying note 24 supra.
35. 443 U.S. 31, 37-38 (1979). In an earlier case, the Supreme Court
admitted evidence which was seized in a warrantless search made in good faith
reliance on a statute subsequently held unconstitutional. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 532-35 (1975). For a further discussion of Peltier, see
notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra.
The Fifth Circuit has reached similar conclusions in dealing with "tech-
nical violations" to develop an exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Corden, 529 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
848 (1976) (an arrest made in good faith reliance on a statute not yet declared
unconstitutional is valid); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975) (evidence obtained in good faith re-
liance on a search warrant later invalidated should be admitted despite a
technical violation of the rules governing the issuance of warrants); United
States v. Kilgon, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that excluding
evidence obtained as a result of an arrest under a vagrancy ordinance later
found unconstitutional would serve no legitimate interest).
[VOL. 27: p. 211
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such an exception.36 In Michigan v. Tucker 37 Justice Rehnquist
authored a majority opinion which stated that "[t]he deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged
in wilful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right." 38 Thus, "[w]here the official action was
pursued in complete good faith .... the deterrence rational loses much
of its force." 39
Subsequently, in Peltier v. United States,40 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, concluded that evidence obtained as the result of an
illegal search should only be excluded if the officer involved knew or
should have known of the unconstitutionality of the search.41
Justice Powell voiced his concern with the exclusionary rule's in-
discriminate application in Brown v. Illinois.42 In his concurrence in
Brown, Justice Powell provided only a limited guide to the kinds of
36. Ball, supra note 19, at 635. The members of the Supreme Court who
have been identified as supporting the good faith mistake exception are Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and White. Id. at 635 n.6.
For a discussion of these Justice's views, see notes 37-54 and accompanying
text infra.
37. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Tucker involved admissibility of the testimony
of a witness who was located based upon the statements of the accused, who
was interrogated without having been giving Miranda warnings. Id. at 435.
For a discussion of these warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Tucker Court held that since the interrogation of the accused took place
before the Miranda decision, the testimony of the witness who was found from
information supplied by the accused was admissible. 417 U.S. at 447-48, 452.
38. 417 U.S. at 447. Although Tucker involved an alleged violation of the
petitioner's fifth amendment rights, Justice Rehnquist recognized that the situa-
tion involved was analogous to past search and seizure cases to rely on the same
rationale, i.e., the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule cannot be furthered
where the officers have acted reasonably and in good faith. Id. at 446-47,
citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
39. 417 U.S. at 447. In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated and therefore not
subject to an exception based on good faith. Id. at 465-66 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
40. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). In Peltier, the Court admitted evidence seized
in a warrantless search made in good faith reliance on a statute which was
subsequently held unconstitutional. Id. at 532-35.
41. Id. at 542.
42. 422 U.S. 590, 606-16 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's concurrence. Id. at 606 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part).
Brown involved the admissibility of statements made by the petitioner
following an illegal arrest. Id. at 591. The issue was whether giving petitioner
his Miranda warnings made the statements admissible. Id. In holding the
statements inadmissible, the Court explained that even though the Miranda
warnings probably saved the statements from exclusion under the fifth amend-
ment, they did not necessarily purge the fourth amendment violation. Id. at
601-03. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (recognizing that
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police conduct which may be considered good faith constitutional
violations.48 He distinguished between "flagrant abusive" violations,
i.e., those violations which presumably can be deterred by application
of the exclusionary rule, at one end of a spectrum and "technical" viola-
tions, i.e., those violations which cannot be deterred by application of
the rule, at the other.44
In Stone v. Powell,45 Chief Justice Burger in a concurring opinion 46
and Justice White in a dissenting opinion 47 joined Justices Rehnquist
and Powell in calling for a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.48 Noting the lack of any substantial proof that the rule does in
fact have a deterrent effect,4 9 Chief Justice Burger expressed dissatis-
faction with the heavy societal cost which application of the rule exacts.5 0
43. 422 U.S. at 610-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice Powell
recognized that although "[a]ll Fourth Amendment violations are by consti-
tutional definition 'unreasonable,' . . . [there] are . . . significant practical
differences that distinguish among violations." Id. at 609 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part). These differences, he reasoned, could be used to construct a
sliding scale to help determine when the exclusionary rule should be applied.
Id. The key, according to Powell, was in always keeping "the deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule sharply in focus." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part).
44. Id. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Powell's attempt at con-
structing a measuring device for application of the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule to statements made following a constitutional violation relies on
the deterrent purpose of that rule. Id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring in
part). "Flagrant abusive" violations constitute one end of the scale because
in "cases in which official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment
rights . .. the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be
effective." Id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concuring in part). At the other end of
the scale are "technical" violations where application of the exclusionary
rule would not serve its deterrence rationale. Id. at 611 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part). For a definition of these types of cases, see text accompany-
ing note 24 supra.
45. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone involved a fourth amendment claim
raised in the context of a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 468-69.
The majority chose not to address the question of a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 482 n.17.
46. Id. at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
47. Id. at 536-42 (White, J., dissenting).
48. See note 36 supra.
49. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 499 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"Notwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to
demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect." Id. For a
further discussion of this assertion, see note 18 supra.
50. 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.j., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
recognized that evidence is suppressed not because it is unreliable, but be-
cause it has been assumed that this is the only effective method to deter the
police from committing constitutional violations. Id. at 499-500. See H.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKs, 260-62 (1967). Thus, he asserted that the burden
is on those seeking to invoke the rule to demonstrate that the rule "serves its
declared deterrent purpose and to show that the results [of its application]
[VOL. 27: p. 211
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He urged the Court to modify the reach 51 of what he considered a
flawed rule.52
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Stone suggested a substantial
limitation on the reach of the exclusionary rule.53 In addition, he
emphasized that where the rationale for the rule's application is not
present the rule should no longer apply.54 This, he argued, was clearly
the case where an officer has acted both reasonably and in good faith,
since by definition a "reasonable" officer would act in the same manner
under similar circumstances, and therefore deterrence was unlikely.5
Against this background the Williams court formulated two alterna-
tive holdings, each of which commanded the support of a different
majority of the court. 56 Judge Politz, writing for one majority, held
outweigh the rule's heavy costs to rational enforcement of the criminal law."
428 U.S. at 499-500 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice saw "it as
an abdication of judicial responsibility to exact such exorbitant costs from
society purely on the basis of speculative and unsubstantiated assumptions."
Id. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
51. 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, al-
though preferring to see the rule eliminated in favor of "some meaningful al-
ternative . . . to protect innocent persons aggrieved by police misconduct,"
was willing to settle for modification until such an alternative becomes
feasible. Id. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring). However, the Chief Jus-
tice suggested that the adoption of a good faith exception might "inspire a
surge of activity toward providing some sort of statutory remedy for persons
injured by police mistakes or misconduct." Id. at 501 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (urging
that a statutory remedy be adopted as an alternative to the exclusionary rule).
52. 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
53. Id. at 537-38 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that the
rule has been taken past its original purposes, and, in many cases, has be-
come "a senseless obstacle in arriving at the truth .. " Id. at 538 (White, J.,
dissenting). He contended "that the rule should be substantially modified so
as to prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence
at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his con-
duct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for his
belief." Id.
54. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the rule's pur-
pose see notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
55. 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White laid heavy
emphasis on the requirement that the officer's actions be reasonable. Id. at
538, 539-40. Justice White's argument emphasized that the officer must be
"acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances."
Id. at 539-40. Justice White concluded, therefore, that "[e]xcluding the evi-
dence can in no way [deter] ...his future conduct unless it is to make him
less willing to do his duty." Id. at 540.
56. 622 F.2d at 833. Chief Judge Coleman and Circuit Judges Roney,
Tjoflat, Garza and Reavley concurred in both majority opinions. Id. at 833
& 840.
The alternative majority opinion holding that the initial arrest for viola-
tion of the court imposed travel restriction was legal was written by Circuit
Judge Politz and joined by Circuit Judges Godbold, Rubin, Kravitch, Frank
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that the original arrest was legal and the evidence therefore admissible
as obtained from a search incident to a valid arrest. 57 Judges Gee and
Vance, co-authoring the alternative majority opinion, held that the
evidence should not be suppressed because there is a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.58 The majority supporting the latter
holding acknowledged that the Supreme Court had never explicitly
adopted such an exception,59 but stated that both logic and the trend of
recent Supreme Court decisions indicated that such an exception was
necessary.6 0
Initially, the alternative majority noted that the Supreme Court
defined the exclusionary rule in Calandra as a judge made protective
device designed to deter official police misconduct."' Therefore, the
M. Johnson, Jr., Henderson, Hatchett, Anderson, Randall, Tate and Thomas
A. Clark, as well as the aforementioned judges. Id. at 833. Thus, sixteen
out of a possible twenty-four judges held that the arrest was legal. Id.
The alternative majority opinion which explicitly adopted a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule was written by Circuit Judges Gee and
Vance and joined by Circuit Judges Brown, Ainsworth, Charles Clark, Hill,
Fay and Sam D. Johnson. Id. at 840. Thus, the number of judges explicitly
adopting a good faith exception totalled thirteen out of a possible twenty-four
judges. Id.
Circuit Judge Hill, joined by Circuit Judge Fay wrote one concurring opin-
ion. Circuit Judge Rubin wrote a second concurring opinion joined by Circuit
Judges Godbold, Kravitch, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Politz, Hatchett, Anderson,
Randall, Tate and Thomas A. Clark.
57. Id. at 836. The majority who found the evidence admissible as inci-
dent to a lawful arrest ruled that Williams' breach of the travel restriction
constituted criminal contempt and as such was an "offense against the United
States" as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. § 878(3). 622 F.2d at 839. For the
text of 21 U.S.C. § 878(3), authorizing warrantless arrests by DEA officers, see
note 12 supra. Therefore, the legality majority concluded, Markonni had
statutory authority to arrest Williams, and the evidence obtained from a
search incident to that arrest was admissible. 622 F.2d at 839.
58. 622 F.2d at 840-41. For a discussion of this finding see notes 59-70
and accompanying text infra.
59. 622 F.2d at 841. The majority stated, however, that the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit has "all but explicitly adopted the technical
violation facet of the good-faith exception," and had rendered opinions giving
implicit support for the good faith mistake exception. Id. For a discussion
of the "technical violation" facet of the good faith exception see text ac-
companying note 24 supra. For a discussion of the "good faith mistake" aspect
of the exception see text accompanying note 23 supra.
60. 622 F.2d at 841. The majority stated that recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have established that the exclusionary rule is not coextensive with the
fourth amendment. Id. The majority also stated that the rule is not required
by the Constitution. Id. The majority concluded that since the courts are not
required to apply the rule, where the purposes of the rule are not effectuated,
it should not be applied. Id. at 840-42. For a discussion of the rule and its
scope, see note 16 supra.
61. 622 F.2d at 841-42. The majority recognized Calandra as the neces-
sary starting point for its analysis because it defined the rule as judge-made
and designed for the sole purpose of deterring official misconduct. Id., citing
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). For a discussion of this
reasoning see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
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court continued, the rule should only apply where its purpose can be
achieved. 2 Having acknowledged this basic premise, the court went on
to note that, because of the high price it exacts from society, the rule is
already inapplicable in many situations where it cannot achieve its
deterrence purpose.63 "Technical violations" and "good faith mistakes,"
the court concluded, clearly fall within this category.64
The majority further supported its argument by citing recent
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases which denied application of the
exclusionary rule on grounds similar to a good faith exception. 65 These
cases all noted that application of the rule to situations involving an
officer who commits a reasonable, good faith violation, will not be likely
to result in deterrence. 66 The court emphasized the narrowness of its
holding in stating the importance of the dual requirements of sub-
jective good faith and objective reasonableness for the exception to
apply.6 7 In that way, only those violations where suppression of the
evidence would serve no deterrent purpose fit within the exception as
fashioned by the Fifth Circuit.68
Having adopted the exception, the majority concluded that on
these facts Officer Markonni had acted reasonably and in good faith.69
The court therefore reversed the district court and held that the evidence
of the heroin should not have been suppressed.7 0
In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Hill, joined by Circuit Judge
Fay, indicated that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was
the only way to achieve the desirable result of lessening the rule's societal
62. 622 F.2d at 841-42.
63. Id. at 842. For a discussion of these past limitations see cases cited in
note 16 supra.
64. 622 F.2d at 842 (citations omitted). The good faith majority pointed
out that the slight possibility of deterrence gained from excluding evidence
discovered as the result of a good faith violation is even less than that which
would be gained if evidence were suppressed in those contexts where the
rule already does not apply. Id. at 842-43. For a discussion of those contexts
where the rule already does not apply see note 16 supra. Therefore, they con-
cluded that societal harm resulting from suppression should be counterbalanced
by the application of a good faith exception to the rule. 622 F.2d at 843.
65. 622 F.2d at 843-46. For a discussion of these cases see notes 33-55
and accompanying text supra.
66. See 622 F.2d at 843-46.
67. 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a. This position is similar to that taken by Jus-
tice White in Stone. See note 54 supra. The "objective reasonableness"
requirement prevents application of the rule in situations where the officer acts
in complete good faith but flagrantly violates the victim's constitutional rights.
622 F.2d at 841 n.4a. Thus, the majority emphasized, adoption of the excep-
tion will in no way undercut the fourth amendment. 622 F.2d at 841-43, 847.
68. 622 F.2d at 842-43, 847.
69. Id. at 846.
70. Id. The good faith exception majority concluded that the evidence
should not be suppressed regardless of whether the arrest of defendant was
legal or not, since they were applying the exception just adopted. Id. at 840.
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costs without reducing its indirect benefit of deterrence.7'1 However, he,
also stated that the legality of Officer Markonni's search was a coni-
stitutional question which need not have been reached once the evidence
was found admissible on other grounds.72
Circuit Judge Rubin also concurred in the result, but stated that
the question of the desirability of a good faith exception would have
been more appropriately decided in a case where the arrest was illegal. 73
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit's articulation of a good faith
exception to the sixty-five year old exclusionary rule is a much needed
step forward in the area of criminal law. In certain circumstances evi-
dence obtained by an unconstitutional search may be the most reliable
evidence available. 74 Excluding such evidence increases the possibility
of setting a guilty defendant free and putting a criminal back on the
streets.75 As a result, the public is frustrated and tends to lose faith in
the judicial system. Thus, the rule's direct effects benefit only the guilty.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court clearly stated in Calandra that
deterrence of police misconduct was the sole reason for the adoption of
the exclusionary rule.70 The rule is not a constitutional right, but a
judge made remedy.77 Therefore, it is suggested that when taking these
two factors together-the cost to society where the rule is applied and
the rule's purpose of deterrence-the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that where the probability of deterrence is so minimal as to be negligible,
the rule should not be applied. Such is the case where the officer com-
mitting a violation has acted reasonably and in the good faith belief
that his actions were lawful.
It is further submitted that the exception is narrowly tailored. By
requiring that the officer's actions be reasonable, the good faith excep-
tion will prevent application of the exclusionary rule where no deterrent
purpose can be served, while at the same time leaving the fourth amend-
ment whole and the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect intact.78
71. Id. at 847-48 (Hill J., concurring). They thought the good faith
exception was a "just result" since it did not cut away at the fourth amend-
ment, and it leaves intact the rule's deterrent effect. Id. at 847 (Hill, J., con-
curring).
72. Id., citing Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("Court will not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of").
73. 622 F.2d at 848 (Rubin, J., concurring). Judge Rubin also argued
that other reasons for the application still need to be taken into consideration.
Id. at 849-50 (Rubin, J., concurring). For a discussion of these other reasons
see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
74. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 50, at 260-62.
75. Id. See also notes 45-55 and accompanying text supra.
76. Id. See Wright, supra note 18, at 737.
77. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
78. See 622 F.2d at 847 (Hill, J., concurring).
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Additionally, it is submitted that because a majority of the Fifth
Circuit clearly adopted the good faith exception, 79 the precedential value
of that holding will not be substantially affected by the court's alterna-
tive holding based on the legality of the arrest.80 Therefore, considering
the need to minimize the harsh results of applying the exclusionary rule
to good faith violations s1 the courts within the Fifth Circuit will most
likely apply the good faith exception.
The impact of the Williams decision is, of course, unknown, the
court having left the correct application of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule to future cases.82 However, given that four current
Supreme Court justices have indicated approval of a good faith ex-
ception, s3 Williams may be the spark necessary to achieve Supreme
Court review of this important question.84 Until such time, however,
we can only applaud the Fifth Circuit's attempt to contain a rule which
has grown far beyond its framers' intent.
David Kuritz
79. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
82. 622 F.2d at 847.
83. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
84. Four Justices must vote in favor of granting certiorari in order for the
Court to hear the case. Ohio v. Price, 360 U.S. 246-47 (1959). See generally
C. WRIGHT, LAw oF FEaEAL COURTS 551 (1976).
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